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Abstract
People with disabilities constitute one of the largest minority groups in Europe, and 
yet our knowledge about how they relate to the political system remains limited. 
In addition to facing practical barriers such as inaccessible campaign material and 
polling stations, they often have fewer resources that facilitate and promote coni-
dence and engagement in politics. Moreover, experiences of discrimination and low 
numbers of politicians with disabilities can generate feelings of disempowerment. 
Using European Social Survey data from 30 countries from 2002 to 2015, this study 
shows that people with disabilities have lower levels of internal and external ei-
cacy, political trust and interest, and electoral participation. The disparities in inter-
nal eicacy and political interest disappear when accounting for education, income, 
employment, and social contact. Meanwhile, signiicant gaps in external eicacy, 
political trust, and turnout remain to be explained. Perceptions of discrimination 
strengthen the internal eicacy and political interest of citizens with disabilities but 
further decrease their external eicacy, political trust, and turnout. The study sheds 
light on a frequently overlooked dimension of political inequality, provides insights 
on several contributing factors, and highlights where further research is needed.
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Introduction
Inequality in political engagement between diferent social groups can be damaging 
to the health of democratic societies, especially if they mirror and reinforce exist-
ing patterns of inequality, marginalization, and discrimination (Verba et al. 1995). 
For this reason, political scientists have devoted considerable amounts of research 
to the political orientations of disadvantaged social groups such as women, ethnic 
and racial minorities, and the poor (e.g. Bergh 2007; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; 
Verba et al. 1995). In contrast, one of the largest minority groups across the world 
has received comparatively little attention so far: people with disabilities. In Europe, 
around one in six people has a disability—that is, around 80 million citizens in total 
(European Commission 2010). They face numerous barriers in life which might 
reduce their conidence in and engagement with democratic politics.
Obvious practical barriers include inaccessible campaign material and polling 
stations (FRA 2014; Schur et  al. 2002). But people with disabilities also tend 
to have lower levels of socioeconomic resources, including education, income, 
employment, and social integration (Eurostat 2017; Kruse 1998; WHO 2011), 
which have been shown to be powerful predictors of political engagement (Brady 
et al. 1995; Burns et al. 2001; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; 
Verba et  al. 1995). In addition, many people with disabilities face stigma, dis-
crimination, marginalization—and some would say oppression (Charlton 1998)—
in their daily lives (Corrigan 2014; Rohmer and Louvet 2018). These experi-
ences and inequalities may generate the impression that the political process is 
not accessible to them and might dampen their engagement, although they might 
also have a mobilizing efect (Anspach 1979; Mattila and Papageorgiou 2017). 
Finally, the low numbers of politicians with disabilities might also contribute 
to disability gaps in political engagement, as has been argued and shown in the 
contexts of other underrepresented groups (e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; 
Atkeson 2003; Banducci et al. 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990).
A small but important set of studies from the US as well as recent research 
from Europe have explored the efects of disability on political attitudes and 
engagement and largely conirm the expected negative efects (e.g., Gastil 2000; 
Mattila et  al. 2017; Mattila and Papageorgiou 2017; Miller and Powell 2016; 
Schur and Adya 2013; Schur et al. 2002, 2003, 2005, 2013; Shields et al. 1998). 
Some of them also examine potential explanations of the gaps, including socioec-
onomic resources, social integration, and discrimination perceptions (Mattila and 
Papageorgiou 2017; Schur and Adya 2013; Schur et al. 2003, 2005; Mattila et al. 
2017). This study contributes to these eforts with a comprehensive discussion 
and analysis of the role of disability in a set of political orientations that are key 
indicators of the health of democratic systems across a large number of countries. 
It examines disability gaps in internal and external political eicacy, political 
trust, and psychological and behavioral political engagement across Europe and 
assesses the roles of resources and feelings of discrimination in explaining them.
The indings from analyses of European Social Survey (ESS) data covering 
30 European countries from 2002 to 2015 are unambiguous: all of the examined 
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political attitudes and behaviors display disability gaps. Diferences in resources 
seem to account for some of the disparities: when controlling for individuals’ 
education, income, employment situation, and social interactions, the gaps in 
internal eicacy and political interest vanish. Education and income play par-
ticularly important roles. Meanwhile, the gaps in external eicacy, political trust, 
and turnout also shrink when accounting for resources but remain statistically 
and substantively signiicant. Feeling discriminated against for having a disabil-
ity inluences the examined political orientations in distinct ways. Interestingly, 
it increases internal eicacy and political interest beyond the levels found among 
people without disabilities. At the same time, it further decreases external ei-
cacy, political trust, and turnout. Yet, it does not explain the disability gaps in 
these orientations.
The study sheds light on a weak spot in European democracy that has received 
fairly little attention by political scientists, policy-makers, and the media alike. At 
the same time, it suggests that the disparities can to some degree be redressed by 
closing gaps in the kinds of resources that empower citizens and facilitate partici-
pation: most importantly, education, integration in the labor market, and inancial 
resources. By discussing additional potential causes for the disability gaps in politi-
cal engagement, including low levels of descriptive representation, the study pre-
pares the ground for further research in this ield.
The Links Between Disability and Political Orientations
This study focuses on ive political orientations widely recognized as essential for 
citizens’ participation in the democratic process, the representation of their opin-
ions, and their sustained support of the democratic system: internal and external ei-
cacy, political trust, and engagement in the form of political interest and electoral 
participation. High aggregate as well as roughly equal levels of eicacy, trust, and 
engagement are often considered key indicators of the health of democratic systems 
(Craig et al. 1990; Dalton 2004; Pharr and Putnam 2000). In this section, I discuss 
whether, and how, having a disability might negatively impact on these orientations 
by identifying factors that might mediate the relationships. The subsequent empiri-
cal analysis concentrates on the roles of two types of individual-level factors: difer-
ent types of resources and perceptions of discrimination.
Political Eicacy
Internal eicacy refers to a person’s conidence in her ability to understand and 
efectively participate in politics, while external eicacy is the belief that govern-
ment is responsive to citizen demands (Craig et al. 1990; Miller et al. 1980). Since 
both types of eicacy inluence citizens’ political engagement (e.g., Campbell et al. 
1960; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972), disparities in them 
between social groups can have far-reaching consequences (Miller 1974, p. 951). 
Studies from the US suggest that people with disabilities tend to have lower levels 
 Political Behavior
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of internal, external, and “group eicacy”, referring to government responsiveness 
to one’s social group (Gastil 2000; Schur and Adya 2013; Schur et al. 2003). Mean-
while, in Finland internal eicacy is not inluenced by disability while external ei-
cacy is at most weakly afected (Mattila et al. 2017).
There are several potential reasons for expecting disability gaps in both types of 
eicacy. People with disabilities are often labeled and treated as dependent and less 
competent (e.g., Anspach 1979; Corrigan 2014; Oliver 1996; Rohmer and Louvet 
2018). Being exposed to this societal narrative and experiencing discrimination 
might afect their conidence in their own ability to participate in various spheres of 
life and society, including politics (Gastil 2000; Schur and Adya 2013). At the same 
time, the persistence of stigma and exclusion might generate the feeling that policy-
makers are not suiciently concerned with improving the situation of people with 
disabilities, reducing their sense of external eicacy (Opokua et al. 2016).
These patterns might be reinforced by the lower levels of education, employment, 
and income and higher risk of social isolation of people with disabilities (Eurostat 
2017; Kruse 1998; Schur and Adya 2013). The relative scarcity of these resources 
may nurture a feeling of being powerless and sidelined (cf., Almond and Verba 
1963; Verba et al. 1995). Indeed, Schur et al. (2003) ind that the disability gap in 
internal eicacy in the US disappears when controlling for demographics, resources, 
and integration in social networks. They emphasize the role of education, which 
provides people with the necessary skills to communicate and interpret politics and 
to organize their activities—what Verba et al. (1995) call “civic skills”. Moreover, 
employment can give people with disabilities “an increased sense of inclusion in 
mainstream society, counteracting the marginalization” (Schur et al. 2003, p. 135), 
and makes them more likely to feel that they are given equal respect and inluence. 
Nevertheless, in this study the gaps in external and group eicacy remain signiicant 
when controlling for resources.
Another potential reason for gaps in both internal and external eicacy are the 
low numbers of politicians with (visible or disclosed) disabilities, which is a widely 
recognized fact despite a lack of comprehensive statistics (Barker 2016; Booth 2017; 
Cowley 2013; FRA 2014; House of Commons 2010). The underrepresentation of 
members of a particular social group in politics can generate the social meaning that 
they are not able to rule (Mansbridge 1999). As a result, they can feel “more sub-
jects than citizens” (Atkeson 2003, p. 1043; see also Phillips 1995) and have lower 
conidence in their ability to efectively participate in politics (Alexander 2012).
As for external eicacy, citizens have been argued and shown to perceive mem-
bers of their own social groups as more accessible, open to communication, and 
responsive (e.g., Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Banducci 
et  al. 2004; Fenno 1978; Gay 2002; Mansbridge 1999). Although the evidence 
on the relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation Pitkin 
(1967) of a social group is mixed (e.g., Bratton and Ray 2002; Kittilson 2008; 
Reher 2018; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005), the argument that political elites 
from a social group are often better at representing the group’s interests due to 
shared experiences remains pervasive (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999). The use 
of the slogan “Nothing About Us Without Us” by disability rights organizations 
since the 1990s can be seen as an indication that many people with disabilities 
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indeed strongly support their active participation in the political decision-mak-
ing process (Charlton 1998). In sum, experiences of stigma and discrimination, 
lower resources providing “civic skills”, and descriptive underrepresentation 
may all lead to lower levels of internal and external eicacy among people with 
disabilities.
Political Trust
Trust in political institutions increases citizens’ acceptance of political decisions 
and thus the strength and efectiveness of democratic regimes (Hetherington 2005; 
Marien and Hooghe 2011). Systematically lower levels of political trust among 
members of a social group can threaten this stability and, perhaps more importantly, 
indicate that they do not trust the political system to protect their rights and serve 
their interests. People with disabilities have been shown to have less trust in govern-
ment oicials and political institutions in the US (Schur and Adya 2013) and Fin-
land (Mattila et al. 2017, p. 60). One potential reason for this trust gap are negative 
direct experiences with public institutions: people with disabilities are more likely 
to require public services, including healthcare, while at the same time experiencing 
more problems accessing them (Mattila and Rapeli 2017; McColl et al. 2010; Sakel-
lariou and Rotarou 2017). This may lead to cynicism about and frustration with the 
government (Gastil 2000; Kumlin 2004), which might be further fueled by other 
experiences of discrimination (Schildkraut 2005).
Political trust might be further depressed through the low numbers of politi-
cians with disabilities. As Mansbridge (1999, p. 651) argues, the feeling of inclu-
sion generated through descriptive representation increases the perceived legiti-
macy of the political system and its outcomes. In addition, “representatives and 
voters who share membership in a subordinate group can also forge bonds of trust 
based speciically on the shared experience of subordination” (1999, p. 641). At 
the same time, the empirical evidence for the relationship between descriptive 
representation and political trust is rather weak in the contexts of gender and race 
(e.g., Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Banducci et  al. 2004; Cowley 2014; Gay 2002; 
Lawless 2004; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005).
Resources might also play a role, although existing research ofers diverging 
conclusions regarding the efects of education, occupational prestige, inancial 
security, and employment on political trust (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963; Cat-
terberg and Moreno 2006; Hooghe et  al. 2012, 2015; Mishler and Rose 2001; 
Rahn and Rudolph 2005). Social interactions in a vibrant civil society have been 
argued to facilitate the development of political institutions in which people trust 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993). Yet, at the individual level, studies have 
found weak or no efects of engagement in voluntary associations (Brehm and 
Rahn 1997; Rahn and Rudolph 2005) and interpersonal trust (Mishler and Rose 
2001; Newton and Norris 2000). Thus, while feeling discriminated against might 
reduce the political trust among people with disabilities, it is unclear whether 
lower levels of resources and of descriptive representation contribute to it.
 Political Behavior
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Political Engagement
Citizens who regularly abstain from voting do not participate in choosing the politi-
cal leaders, signal their policy preferences to them, or incentivize them to respond 
to their demands in view of future elections (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p. 247; 
Verba et al. 1995). Consequently, their preferences are likely to be underrepresented 
in policy (cf., Peters and Ensink 2015), which can lead them to further withdraw 
from politics (Reher 2014). This “vicious circle” is particularly problematic if it dis-
proportionately afects certain social groups, especially if they are already disadvan-
taged, like people with disabilities.
Two key indicators of engagement are electoral participation and psychological 
engagement in the form of political interest, which is an important predictor of turn-
out (Campbell et al. 1960). Research from the US (Miller and Powell 2016; Schur 
and Adya 2013; Schur and Kruse 2000; Schur et al. 2002, 2005; Shields et al. 1998) 
and Europe (Mattila and Papageorgiou 2017; Wass et  al. 2017, including Finland 
(Mattila et al. 2017) and the UK (Clarke et al. 2006), has consistently shown that 
people with disabilities are less likely to register to vote and to turn out at the bal-
lot box. Mental health issues as well as poor health more generally can also depress 
turnout (e.g., Denny and Doyle 2007; Mattila et al. 2013, 2017; Ojeda 2017; Ojeda 
2015; Pacheco and Fletcher 2015).
The evidence is much more mixed when it comes to interest in politics. In the US, 
Gastil (2000) observes higher interest levels among people with disabilities, whereas 
Schur and Adya (2013) ind no coherent pattern. Mattila et al. (2017, p. 57) discover 
a negative efect of health but not of disability in Finland. This suggests that many 
people with disabilities abstain from voting not because they are apathetic towards 
politics but because they are prevented from doing so by physical or psychological 
barriers. Certain types of impairment can make it very diicult to access political 
information, participate in group meetings and events, and get to the polling station 
(FRA 2014; House of Commons 2010; Schur et al. 2002). This explains why postal 
voting is more common among people with disabilities in the US (Miller and Powell 
2016) and why those with diiculties going outside by themselves have the lowest 
turnout (Schur and Adya 2013).
Resources are also likely to matter here: education, income, and employment 
provide citizens with the skills, time, and means to follow the political debate and 
take part in political activities. Moreover, meeting others at the workplace, in edu-
cational institutions or socially exposes people to a range of political views and dis-
cussion and makes them more likely to be recruited into political groups and activi-
ties (Brady et al. 1995; Burns et al. 2001; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and 
Nie 1972; Verba et  al. 1995; Wolinger and Rosenstone 1980). These opportuni-
ties remain out of reach for many people with disabilities due to lower education, 
income, and employment levels. Overcoming various barriers in everyday life also 
requires time, money, and mental resources, which could otherwise be invested in 
other activities like political activism (Gastil 2000: 599; Schur et al. 2002, 2013). 
Several studies have explored the role of resources in the disability gap in turn-
out, with mixed results. Education explained a large part of the turnout gap in one 
US study (Schur and Adya 2013) but mattered only among those who were not 
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employed in another (Schur et  al. 2002). Income did not explain the turnout gap 
in Finland (Mattila et al. 2017, p. 46). Conversely, several US studies suggest that 
employment is crucial for closing the disability turnout gap and that income is partly 
driving this efect (Schur and Kruse 2000; Schur et al. 2002).
Part of the reason for this mixed picture might be that perceptions of discrimi-
nation and devaluation, which may be linked to low levels of resources, might at 
the same time increase political engagement. Such mobilization efects are thought 
to require a positive self-image (Anspach 1979), attribution of blame to the system 
(Miller et al. 1981), identiication with the minority group (Schildkraut 2005), and 
resentment about unfair treatment (Mattila and Papageorgiou 2017). Again, the 
existing evidence is mixed: Mattila and Papageorgiou (2017) ind that feelings of 
disability-based discrimination amplify the positive efects of disability on contact-
ing politicians and participating in protests but also its negative efect on voting.
Finally, descriptive representation and its empowering efect might again play a 
role. There is evidence for a positive efect of descriptive representation on turn-
out among women and ethnic and racial minorities (Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007; 
Atkeson 2003; Barreto 2007; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Banducci et  al. 2004; but 
see Gay 2001; Karp and Banducci 2008; Bühlmann and Schädel 2012), whereas 
it is much weaker for political interest (Atkeson 2003; Reingold and Harrell 2010). 
These indings reinforce the expectation of a disability gap in turnout but not politi-
cal interest.
Data and Method
To examine the efects of disability on the ive political orientations and the roles of 
resources and perceptions of discrimination, I use data from 30 countries (see Fig. 1) 
from the irst seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS), covering the period 
2002–20151. The variable indicating whether a respondent has a disability is based 
on the survey question “Are you hampered in your daily activities in any way by any 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Fig. 1  Proportions of respondents indicating a disability in 30 European countries
1 The dataset and code to replicate all analysis and igures are available in the Political Behavior Data-
verse (https ://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JXJ0Z S)
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longstanding illness, or disability, inirmity or mental health problem? If yes, is that 
a lot or to some extent?” This question, which is identical or similar to those used 
in other studies of disability and political orientations (e.g., Gastil 2000; Mattila and 
Papageorgiou 2017; Mattila and Rapeli 2017), includes important elements from the 
deinition in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, according to which “persons with disabilities include those who have 
long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction 
with various barriers may hinder their full and efective participation in society on an 
equal basis with others” (UN General Assembly 2007). The deinition relects the con-
tention of the widely accepted social model of disability that “it is society which disa-
bles physically impaired people” by creating barriers hindering their full participation 
in society (Oliver 1996, p. 22; see also Shakespeare and Watson 1997; WHO 2001).
Overall, 24.4% of respondents indicated that they were restricted in their daily 
activities, with 18.3% being hampered ‘to some extent’ and 6.0% ‘a lot’. I merge the 
latter two categories to create a binary indicator of disability. Figure 1 shows the pro-
portions of respondents with a disability for each country, which ranges from 14.8% in 
Ireland to 38.3% in Latvia. These stark cross-national diferences relect the contingent 
nature of disability: people with the same kinds of impairment may be restricted to 
diferent degrees in diferent societies. Yet, the measure is also likely to be sensitive to 
under- and overreporting due to its subjective nature. Cross-national diferences in the 
stigma associated with disability might afect individuals’ tendency to downplay their 
“diferentness” and reconcile their positive self-image with their commitment “to cul-
tural conceptions of normalcy” (Anspach 1979, p. 769; cf., Watson 2002).
At the same time, survey questions that ask about impairments in a medical sense 
ignore the importance of barriers emphasized by the social model. Meanwhile, 
measures identifying respondents as having a disability if they name it as the reason 
for not participating in the labor market (e.g., Shields et al. 1998) have the disadvan-
tage of missing the many people with disabilities who are in full-time or part-time 
employment or are not part of the labor force for other reasons (Hale 2001). This is 
important since the role of disability in political orientations might vary between 
these diferent groups of citizens (Schur and Kruse 2000; Schur et al. 2002).
Dependent Variables
I use a set of ive dependent variables measuring political orientations. The two 
measures of eicacy are each additive indices of three survey items with 11-point 
scales. Internal efficacy combines the questions “How able do you think you are to 
take an active role in a group involved with political issues?”, “How conident are 
you in your own ability to participate in politics?”, and “How easy do you person-
ally ind it to take part in politics?” External efficacy is measured by the items “How 
much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have 
a say in what the government does?”, “How much would you say that the political 
system in [country] allows people like you to have an inluence on politics?”, and 
“How much would you say that politicians care what people like you think?”. With 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.84 the internal consistency of both scales is high. The eicacy 
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items are only included in Round 7 (2014/2015), reducing the number of countries 
analyzed for these items to 19.
A political trust index was created by averaging respondents’ trust in politicians, 
parties, and the national parliament measured on 11-point scales.2 This index has 
a high internal validity with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91. Political interest is measured 
on a four-point scale from ‘not interested at all’ to ‘very interested’. All four scales 
were normalized to range from 0 to 1. Lastly, respondents’ turnout is measured by 
the question of whether they voted in the last election. It should be noted that this 
measure includes both voting in person and by mail, which is important given that 
people with mobility impairments demonstrate higher levels of postal voting (Miller 
and Powell 2016; Schur and Adya 2013). An issue that all researchers analyzing 
turnout through survey data face is overreporting. However, Wass et  al. (2017, p. 
509) report relatively low rates of overreporting for Rounds 1–6 of the ESS (7.9 
percentage points). Since we have no reason to expect that having a disability should 
afect overreporting, it is unlikely to bias the results.
Control Variables
I include a set of ive resource indicators to test whether disability (still) inluences 
the political orientations when adding them to the models. Education is measured by 
the number of years spent in full-time education. Income is the decile of the house-
hold income range in the country into which the respondent falls.3 Employment 
might afect political engagement not only by instilling a sense of inancial auton-
omy and contribution to society but also by generating social interactions that expose 
people to political discussion and recruitment. I therefore create the dummy variable 
workplace, where 0 is assigned to respondents who are unemployed, cannot work 
because they are permanently sick or disabled, are doing housework, are looking after 
dependents or are retired. 1 indicates being in paid work, education or military and 
community service. Social contact indicates the frequency with which a respondent 
meets socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues, measured on a 7-point scale 
ranging from ‘never’ to ‘every day’. Religious service attendance, another potential 
source of social integration and civic skills, is measured as a dummy with 1 indicat-
ing monthly to daily attendance and 0 indicating less frequent or no attendance.
To examine the role of discrimination, I follow Mattila and Papageorgiou (2017) 
by dividing respondents into three groups. Using the survey items “Would you 
describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this 
country?” and “On what grounds is your group discriminated against?”, I construct 
an indicator that distinguishes between people without disabilities, those who have 
2 Round 1 of the ESS did not include the measure of trust in parties; here, the index is the mean of trust 
in parliament and trust in politicians. Similarly, where data on one or two of the components is missing 
for an individual respondent, the index value is composed of the non-missing data.
3 In Rounds 1–3, the ESS measured income on a uniform scale with 12 categories. These categories 
were assigned to the respective deciles in the country based on the coding in Round 4 or the next round 
in which a country participated. If a category overlaps with the income ranges of more than one decile, it 
was recoded into the mean of these deciles.
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a disability and feel discriminated against on these grounds, and those who have a 
disability but do not feel discriminated against. Among the respondents with a dis-
ability, 1.9% feel discriminated against because of it. While this proportion is quite 
low, with 1374 respondents the category is suiciently large for the analyses (2017, 
p. 512).
Finally, I include several demographic controls: age in years and age squared, 
a female dummy, and a dummy indicating whether a respondent has an immigra-
tion background, meaning that he or she or at least one parent was born outside the 
country. Age is particularly important since it is known to have a (curvilinear) efect 
on political engagement and at the same time strongly increases the likelihood of 
having a disability (the mean age in the sample is 59 years among people with and 
46 years among people without disabilities).4
Results
I begin by exploring the disparities in political attitudes and engagement related 
to disability in each European country in the sample. I estimate linear regression 
models for internal and external eicacy, political trust, and political interest and 
a logistic regression model for turnout, including the disability indicator as well as 
the demographic controls as independent variables and year ixed efects. Figure 2 
shows the coeicients of disability for each country. While there is some cross-
national variation in the size and statistical signiicance of the efect for each of the 
dependent variables, it is negative and statistically signiicant in the large majority 
of cases. On average, levels of internal and external eicacy, trust, and interest are 
around 3 percentage points lower among people with disabilities. Reported turnout 
rates are on average 5 percentage points lower, with the highest gap at around 9 per-
centage points in Luxembourg.
A prerequisite for resources to explain parts of these gaps is that they difer 
between people with and without disabilities. Figure 3 shows the mean diferences 
in each country. In all countries, people with disabilities indeed have lower levels of 
education (1.8 years less on average), income (1.3 deciles lower), employment (35 
percentage points less), and social contact (0.45 points lower on the 7-point scale; 
only Iceland does not have a signiicant disability gap). In contrast, people with dis-
abilities are signiicantly more likely to attend religious services in two-thirds of the 
countries (5.8 percentage points on average). We might thus expect parts of the dis-
ability gaps to be explained by these diferences in resources.
In order to test this expectation, I regress each of the dependent variables on dis-
ability alongside the demographic control variables on the pooled sample. I then 
include the resource indicators to examine the extent to which they can account 
for the relationship between disability and political orientations. It should be noted 
4 The role of age in the relationships between disability and political interest and turnout is explored in 
the Supporting Information (SI) B. Details about coding and descriptives for all variables can be found 
in SI A.
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that it is not possible with the cross-sectional data to establish to what extent the 
resources are causal mediators of the disability-orientations relationships, as some 
of them may at the same time be causes or covariates of disability (cf., Fiedler et al. 
2011): in particular education and income have been pointed out as determinants 
of health and disability (Adams et al. 2003; Adda et al. 2003; Schoeni et al. 2005). 
Nevertheless, examining how the disability gaps in political orientations change 
when controlling for resources will provide indications about the extent to which the 
gaps may be addressed by reducing diferences in resources and the need to identify 
additional explanations.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 display the results of a set of multilevel linear regression models 
(multilevel logit regression for turnout).5 The models are estimated on the pooled 
data and include year ixed efects as well as random intercept variance components 
at the country level, taking into account that unobserved variables at this level may 
afect citizens’ political orientations. The irst set of models include disability as 
well as age, age squared, gender, and immigration background.6 In the second set 
of models, I add the resource indicators. The third set of models regress the out-
comes on the indicator of disability discrimination alongside the demographic con-
trols; the fourth add the resources. Finally, I estimate additional models for political 
trust, adding external eicacy as an independent variable, and for turnout, including 
political interest and strength of party identiication.  
Model 1a in Table  1 shows that having a disability is associated with a lower 
level of internal eicacy of around 3.3 percentage points, around half the magni-
tude of the efect of gender. However, when the resource indicators are included, all 
of which have signiicant positive efects on internal eicacy, the coeicient of dis-
ability becomes insigniicant (Model 1b). We can examine how much each resource 
accounts for the disability coeicient by including one at a time (results not shown). 
The coeicient shrinks most strongly when controlling for income (from –0.033 
to − 0.018) and education (− 0.020), followed by employment (− 0.026), while it 
remains more or less stable when controlling for social interactions (− 0.031) and 
religious service attendance (− 0.033). Achievements in education and the economy 
thus seem to be the most important factors among those analyzed to instill people 
with disabilities with the conidence to efectively participate in politics.
In the models testing the role of discrimination, the coeicients compare both 
groups of people with disabilities to those without disabilities. Below the tables, I 
provide the coeicients comparing people with disabilities who feel discriminated 
against to those who do not. In Model 1c, a disability gap in internal eicacy only 
exists for people who do not feel discriminated against. This gap vanishes when 
6 Models that include only disability as an independent variable are shown in Table C1. When excluding 
the demographics, disability is negatively associated with internal and external eicacy and political trust 
but unrelated to political interest and turnout. Yet, since the relationships are clearly confounded by age 
(cf. SI B), these models are not reported here.
5 The results of equivalent models to those in Tables 1 and 2 but with country ixed efects instead of 
random efects are provided in Tables C3–C5 and are almost identical. SI D shows the coeicients of dis-
ability for interest, trust, and turnout separately for each ESS round; there are no substantial or systematic 
diferences over time.
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controlling for the resources (Model 1d). In this model, people who feel discrimi-
nated against because of their disability in fact feel more capable of participating in 
politics than those who do not perceive discrimination or are not disabled. This ind-
ing lends support to the idea that a group identity paired with resentment towards 
society’s treatment of the group can have a mobilizing efect (cf., Mattila and Papa-
georgiou 2017).
The disability gap in external eicacy, which is initially similar in size to that 
in internal eicacy, decreases by about half when the resources are included in the 
model but remains statistically signiicant (Model 2b), in line with previous ind-
ings from the US (Gastil 2000; Schur and Adya 2013; Schur et al. 2003). The gap 
is now similarly large as that between people with a diference of 2 years of educa-
tion. Again, while no one resource variable by itself is responsible for decreasing 
the disability gap, education, income, and employment are the most important fac-
tors (results not shown). Interestingly, feeling discriminated against on the grounds 
of disability has the opposite efect for external eicacy as for internal eicacy: it 
further decreases feelings of politicians’ responsiveness (Model 2c), although the 
diference between disabled people who do and do not feel discriminated against 
becomes insigniicant when controlling for resources (Model 2d). Keeping resource 
levels constant, people with a disability who do not report discrimination have a 1.6 
percentage points lower level of external eicacy as compared to non-disabled peo-
ple, while feeling discriminated against increases this gap to 3.5 percentage points.
Political trust has a disability gap of 3.4 percentage points, which is twice as large 
as the one between people with and without an immigration background (Table 2, 
Models 3a). All of the resources positively inluence political trust, but controlling 
for them only decreases the disability gap by a third (Model 3b). Again, education, 
income, and employment decrease the coeicient most strongly (results not shown). 
For people who feel discriminated against due to their disability, the diference 
in trust to people without disabilities is quite large at 9 percentage points (Model 
3c), shrinking only slightly when controlling for the resources. Meanwhile, a sig-
niicant gap also continues to exist for people with disabilities with no discrimina-
tion perceptions. Since external eicacy is known to be an important predictor of 
political trust, I also estimate a model including external eicacy as an independent 
variable to test whether it explains the negative efects of disability and discrimina-
tion on trust. While the coeicients decrease in magnitude, they remain statistically 
signiicant.7
While previous research has not consistently found efects of disability on politi-
cal interest (e.g., Gastil 2000; Mattila et al. 2017; Schur and Adya 2013), we observe 
a statistically signiicant efect when controlling for other demographics. However, 
it disappears when the resources are controlled for (Model 4b). This supports the 
7 The diference in trust between people with disabilities who feel discriminated against and those who 
do not is insigniicant in Model 3e, but this is also the case in Model 3d when estimated on the reduced 
sample for which data on external eicacy exists, which means that there is no evidence that external 
eicacy mediates the efect of discrimination. Overall, the results are very similar when analyzing each 
component of the trust index separately (Table C6).
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notion that the cognitive skills people obtain through education are crucial in ena-
bling them to make sense of and engage with the political debate. Education and 
income reduce the disability coeicient most strongly, followed by employment. 
Meanwhile social interactions and religious service attendance, which have been 
argued to generate political discussion, appear to be much less important in generat-
ing political interest (results not shown). Feeling discriminated against increases the 
political interest of people with disabilities to the same level as that of people with-
out disabilities, without taking resources into account (Model 4c). When controlling 
for the resources, the disability gap in interest vanishes for those who do not feel 
discriminated against, while those who do feel discriminated against now actually 
have higher political interest levels by around 4 percentage points than both other 
groups.8
Finally, a negative disability gap also exists in turnout and maintains statistical 
signiicance after accounting for resources and discrimination (Model 5d). This 
remains the case even when including political interest and the strength of party 
identiication, which is measured on a 5-point scale ranging from no party identi-
ication to feeling very close to a political party (Model 5e). Feeling discriminated 
against magniies the negative efect of disability on turnout, as in Mattila and Papa-
georgiou’s (2017) study. While controlling for resources makes the turnout difer-
ence between people with disabilities who do and those who do not feel discrimi-
nation non-signiicant, both gaps to people without disabilities remain statistically 
signiicant (Model 5d).
To compare the magnitudes of the disability gap across the diferent models, I dis-
play the predicted probabilities of turnout for the diferent voter groups in Table 4. 
Controlling for age, gender, and immigrant background (Model 5a), the turnout rates 
of voters with disabilities are about 5 percentage points lower than those of voters 
without disabilities. This gap is relatively small compared to some of the igures 
from the US, where Schur et al. (2002) found a 20 percentage point diference in 
the 1998 election and Schur and Adya (2013) reported gaps between 4 and 17 per-
centage points. Still, it shows that Europeans with disabilities are substantially less 
likely to participate in deciding who governs their country. The diference is roughly 
halved to 2.3 percentage points when the resources are controlled for (Model 5b).
The predicted turnout from Model 5c shows that disability gap increases to 
almost 9 percentage points for people who feel discriminated against. As indicated 
above, the diference between disabled people with and without feelings of discrimi-
nation shrinks substantially when controlling for resources in Model 5d, suggesting 
that deprivation might partly drive the negative efect of discrimination on turnout. 
Adding political interest and party identiication to the model only changes the pre-
dicted turnout levels marginally, suggesting that they do not play important roles in 
explaining the disability gap. This inding is not too surprising given that we found 
no disability gap in political interest after accounting for diferences in resources.
8 Since political interest is measured on an ordinal 4-point scale, I also estimate multilevel ordered logit 
models as a robustness check (Table C2). The results conirm those presented here.
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Conclusion
People with disabilities still face a multitude of barriers in our societies which can 
make it diicult for them to fully participate and succeed in the labor market and 
to have a fulilling social and family life (Schur et al. 2013). In addition, this study 
showed, disabled people feel less conident in their ability to participate in and inlu-
ence politics, perceive the political system as less responsive, and have lower trust 
in parliament, parties, and politicians. They also have less interest in politics and 
a lower propensity to vote. These indings highlight a regularly overlooked dimen-
sion of inequality in European democracies. They contribute to the fairly limited 
amount of existing research on the role of disability in political orientations, which 
has focused primarily on the US (e.g., Gastil 2000; Schur and Adya 2013; Schur 
et al. 2002, 2003; Shields et al. 1998) but more recently also on Europe, with impor-
tant evidence coming from Finland (e.g., Mattila et al. 2017; Mattila and Papageor-
giou 2017).
The disability gaps uncovered here might even still underestimate the real dis-
parities. Individuals with impairments that make engagement diicult might also 
have a higher probability of nonresponse in standardized surveys (FRA 2014, p. 
30). Yet, this risk is perhaps lower in the face-to-face interviews used by the ESS, 
on which this study draws, than for phone or internet surveys. Moreover, the cross-
national variation in the proportion of citizens who report a disability in the survey 
(between 15 and 38%) suggests that the measure might not correctly identify all dis-
abled respondents, which might lead to an underestimation of the efects on politi-
cal orientations. At the same time, cross-national variation in people’s propensity to 
identify as having a disability might also relect diferences in the extent to which 
barriers are addressed and removed. Further research should explore these difer-
ences and their consequences for the estimation of gaps in political orientations in 
more depth.
The implications of the indings are disconcerting. If members of a marginalized 
social group are skeptical about the political institutions that are meant to represent 
them and refrain from making their voices heard, their views are unlikely to be con-
sidered in the legislative process. This might entrench the existing inequalities and 
injustices (cf., Peters and Ensink 2015). What is more, a lack of attention to their 
concerns by political decision-makers may further decrease their satisfaction and 
engagement with the democratic process (Reher 2014, 2015). To react to these chal-
lenges, it is crucial to identify what causes the disability gaps.
While this study discusses number of potential drivers, the empirical analysis 
focused on a set of individual-level factors: cognitive, inancial, and social resources 
that are known to facilitate political engagement as well as perceptions of discrimi-
nation. The lower average levels of education, income, employment, and social 
interactions of people with disabilities in Europe can indeed explain some of the 
disparities in political orientations, conirming previous indings from the US (Schur 
et  al. 2002, 2003). Accounting for these factors eliminated the disability gaps in 
internal eicacy and political interest. Yet, they only explain parts of the disparities 
in external eicacy, political trust, and electoral participation.
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Feeling discriminated against inluences the orientations of people with disabili-
ties in diverse ways. It increases their internal eicacy and political interest, lending 
support to the idea that a positive group identity combined with feelings of resent-
ment can provide citizens with a sense of agency and the motivation to change their 
situation (Anspach 1979; Mattila and Papageorgiou 2017). At the same time, feel-
ings of discrimination further decrease the external eicacy and turnout of peo-
ple with disabilities, although these efects are partly due to lower resource levels. 
Meanwhile, its negative efect on political trust remains quite strong after control-
ling for resources. Crucially, even people with disabilities who do not feel discrimi-
nated against have lower levels of external eicacy and turnout than people without 
disabilities. They also vote at lower rates, which cannot be explained by political 
interest and partisanship. We need further research to explore what explains the per-
sisting disability gaps.
One factor which was discussed in detail but not empirically examined, not least 
due to a lack of data, is the descriptive representation of people with disabilities in 
politics. Theories and evidence suggest that the presence of underrepresented social 
groups at the elite level can have powerful impacts on the attitudes and participation 
of their members (e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Atkeson 2003; Banducci 
et  al. 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990). Such efects are argued to be partly due to 
citizens’ perceptions that their interests are better represented by politicians who are 
‘like them’. Indeed, the substantive representation of the concerns of citizens with 
disabilities is another potentially important factor explaining the orientation gaps. 
As Guldvik et al. (2013, pp. 79–80) argue,
Disabled people comprise a diverse group with a variety of experiences and 
histories. They do not necessarily have common interests, but because of com-
mon experiences they may have interests that are opposed to those that the 
majority of non-disabled people may hold.
Several studies support this, suggesting that people with disabilities care more 
strongly about disability rights and health care, among other issues (Gastil 2000; 
Mattila et al. 2017; Schur and Adya 2013). If these issues are not salient in parties’ 
and candidates’ agendas, this ‘issue public’ (Converse 1964) might feel indifer-
ent towards election outcomes, ind it diicult to decide how to vote, and therefore 
abstain (Henderson 2014; Krosnick 1990; Mattila et al. 2017: 91; Reher 2014).
Macro-level factors of this kind might also explain some of the cross-national 
diferences in the disability gaps that were shown but whose investigation was 
beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, various institutional factors, includ-
ing voter facilitation instruments such as postal voting and accessible polling sta-
tions and ballot papers, might increase not only turnout but also eicacy and politi-
cal trust (Opokua et  al. 2016). Although Wass et  al. (2017) did not ind that they 
increased turnout among voters with disabilities, Schur and Adya (2013) and Miller 
and Powell (2016) found positive relationships between disability and mail voting. 
Public services and beneits might also increase feelings of political empowerment 
and engagement, although this likely depends on whether they are designed to help 
1 3
Political Behavior 
people gain independence and participate fully in society or function as welfare 
schemes.
Research on the topic should also be further developed in terms of depth—by 
exploring diferences between impairment types (cf., Schur and Adya 2013)—and 
breadth—by looking beyond Europe and North America. Finally, within-individual 
analysis over time using panel data has the potential to further approach the causal 
identiication of the efects of disability. This will illuminate the direction of inlu-
ence between disability and resources and help account for variables that might 
inluence both the likelihood of having a disability and political orientations.
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